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Introduction
Innovation is a central and crucial aspect of the functioning of capitalistic economies (see Schumpeter (1911 Schumpeter ( , 1942 ). In particular, there exists a rich literature analyzing the incentives for industrial innovation, starting with Arrow (1962) . In the present paper, however, we take as given that a new product has emerged and concentrate on the time-profile of its spread in a population of consumers.
The analysis of the process of adoption of a new product (in the following termed newproduct diffusion) constitutes an important research area in both marketing science and economics. From a practitioner's perspective, relevant questions are, for instance, how to forecast whether the new product will "take-off" (see Garber et al. (2004) ), or, once it did, the level of its future sales depending on the use of elements of the marketing mix (see e.g. Bass et al. (2000) ; see also Chandrasekaran and Tellis (2005) for a general overview).
From a more theoretical perspective, one is interested, for instance, in why consumers develop preferences for new products (see Witt (2001) ), or whether such process tend to be "path-dependent" or "ergodic" (see David (1985) ).
Three main approaches to quantitative modeling of the time-profile of new-product diffusion can be distinguished. First, there are phenomenological models of new-product diffusion. This literature starts with Bass (1969) . His model has seen numerous refinements over the years (for an overview, see Mahajan et al. (1990 Mahajan et al. ( , 1995 ), and can reproduce the evolution of sales over a wide range of the product life cycle employing appropriate parameter fits. Second, micro-models of new-product diffusion focusing on rational individual decision-making were proposed (see, for instance, David and Olson (1986, 1992) ). These models typically ascribe to consumers a high degree of sophistication, in particular they correctly foresee the future evolution of the market. The dynamics of diffusion is driven by the interplay of expectations and maximization. Third, there appeared stochastic micromodels of new-product diffusion which focus on collective effects, often with a myopic model of decision making. These models are variants of the spatial stochastic process called Our present model is percolation-based. It is motivated by the empirical phenomenon that in the early stages of new-product diffusion low levels of sales often persist over a prolonged period of time before a "take-off" occurs (for a detailed discussion of this phe-nomenon see Golder and Tellis (1997) and Geroski (2003) ). Serving as a prototypical example of this phenomenon, Figure 1 (top) depicts the cumulative number of adopters of a novel agricultural technique in Iowa in the first half of the last century. The data in Figure 1 (top) is adapted from Ryan and Gross (1943) . More examples of long-tailed diffusion curves along with a discussion of the phenomenon of a delayed "take-off" of new products can be found in Mort (1991) and Golder and Tellis (1997) .
We find that our model provides a possible analytical explanation for delayed take-off in new-product diffusion. It does so with a myopic individual decision-making model, i.e.
avoiding a self-fulfilling-prophecy mechanism relying on rational expectations. Up to our knowledge, it is the first model capable of explaining delayed take-off as a purely collective coordination phenomenon. 2 The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 specifies the basic model. Section 3 introduces macroscopic feedbacks and shows by Monte Carlo simulations that the latter can lead to a diffusion-dynamics exhibiting a delayed take-off.
The paper concludes with a brief discussion of some additional aspects of our model.
The basic model
We model the process of diffusion of a new product 3 (the emergence of which is assumed rather than explained in our model) among a large population of consumers. Time is discrete. In any period t, a consumer may buy either one unit of the product or none, with at most one unit bought over the entire time horizon. The individual decision model of a consumer consists of three steps: firstly, learning the product's characteristics, secondly, forming an individual (subjective) valuation of it, and thirdly, comparing one's individual valuation with the price set by the producer.
An essential ingredient of our model is a "spatial" dynamics facilitating individual assessment of the product's value by each potential buyer. Underlying this dynamics is a social network -exogenous in the present model 4 -which we take to be a two-dimensional square lattice. It can be represented by a graph, with Z 2 as the set of nodes and a link between any two a, b ∈ Z 2 if and only if ||a − b|| = 1, with || · || denoting the Euclidean distance. In our finite model, the set of consumers is represented by a finite square-shaped subset Λ ⊂ Z 2 . Two consumers who are directly linked are called nearest neighbors. Each consumer -except those at the boundary of Λ -has thus four nearest neighbors.
Our particular choice of the network model is presumably not a realistic one. Alas, we are not aware of empirical studies investigating topologies of interactions in our particular context, while results of studies investigating sociological network topologies related with other types of human interactions do not appear to be a-priori transferable (see Schnegg (2006)). Yet the principle mechanism by which a "take-off dynamics" is generated in our model does not depend on the specific topology of the underlying network (with an exceptional case to be discussed in the last section of this paper).
In each period, the nearest neighbors of those consumers who bought the product in the immediately preceding period acquaint themselves with the product. 5, 6 Based on that experience they form their individual valuations of the product 7 reflected in the reservation price θ a (i.e. the highest price at which consumer a would buy). That assumption implies that it is only via experiencing the product via one's immediate social environment that a consumer forms the valuation of it. In that sense, the innovation is "socially transmitted".
We assume in our model that the transfer of "experience of the product" from one consumer to another is "neutral" in the sense that the valuation formed by consumer a does not depend on the valuation of that buyer who triggered the formation of a's valuation.
Thus we specify that θ a is a realization of the random variable Θ a with the family (Θ a ) a∈Λ independently identically distributed. To directly relate our basic model to the standard percolation model, each random variable is equi-distributed on [0, 1].
Finally, the consumer's decision to buy the new product is the following: consumer a buys the product if her individual valuation θ a exceeds or equals the price p.
We employ a simple specification of the supply side as consisting of a "non-maximizing" monopolist using mark-up pricing i.e. the price p is given by the formula
5 In the first period, the dynamics is initialized by the introduction of a fixed number of early buyers located randomly in the population. The origin of such "early birds" is exogenous to our model. 6 We assume that buyers enable all their nearest neighbors to experience the product corresponding to the case of pure site-percolation, i.e. bonds are always "open". 7 We assume that the formation of the individual valuation θ a is made only once thus it is not reassessed if in a later period another nearest neighbor of consumer a buys the product.
with c denoting the unit production costs and m a positive number, the time-constant mark- The dynamics of the model specified so far is well-known from the literature on percolation models. In the following we briefly describe some basic properties of these models.
In the simplest case of an (atemporal) site-percolation model with some underlying graph structure, each site of the graph is randomly assigned a value from {0, 1}, with probability P for a realization of the value 1. The assignment of each value is stochastically independent of the values assigned to other sites. Percolation is said to occur if there appears at least one infinite unbounded cluster 8 of sites with value 1. It turns out that there is a threshold-value for the probability P , denoted by P c , such that such an infinite cluster of "active" sites occurs with probability 1 for P > P c and with probability 0 for P < P c (see Stauffer and Aharony (1995) ). For the particular graph structure specified in the paper (two-dimensional square lattice) we have approximately P c = 0.592743.
To apply Monte-Carlo techniques for the analysis of percolation models, dynamic processes were proposed enabling to decide whether or not percolation occurs in a given model based on the behavior of the associated process. For such processes the percolation threshold P c corresponds to that value of the probability P above which diffusion spreads over the entire graph with a significant probability, and below which it "dies out" unless for extremely rare instances. The dynamics of our model specified above corresponds to the Leath-algorithm of percolation (Leath (1976) ).
Let us now return to our particular model context. The probability for a consumer to buy the product, given she comes to form her valuation (the latter condition is referred to as C), is the probability that her valuation θ a falls into the interval Note that while the functional form of the time-profile of sales in our model depends on the particular network structure, the occurrence of spread over the entire population of 8 A cluster is a set of connected "occupied" sites.
consumers depends only on whether the prevailing price p is above or below p c .
In the next section we will extend our basic model by macroscopic feedbacks which can affect the price or the valuation (or both). It turns out that this feature can produce a "drift" of the percolation dynamics from a "non-percolating regime" to a "percolating regime", thereby facilitating a dynamics corresponding to a delayed "take-off".
3 New-product diffusion with macroscopic feedbacks
In the following we introduce macroscopic feedbacks affecting the supply side or the demand side (or both). In the extended model the price and the individual valuation may be timedependent such that the general decision rule reads: consumer a buys in t with t ≥ t a if θ a,t ≥ p t and θ a,t < p τ for all τ : t a ≤ τ < t with t a denoting the time period in which consumer a learns the product's characteristics and forms an initial valuation.
We first turn to feedback affecting the supply side assuming that unit production costs decrease with the cumulative quantity of units already produced. The decrease of unit production costs is empirically well established and explained by learning within the firm.
Decreasing unit production costs are associated with the "learning curve" (see e.g. Yelle (1979) ) and with the related notion of "economies of scale" (see e.g. Scherer and Ross (1990) ). In our model, the "learning curve" is represented by a functional relationship
) with N t−1 denoting the number of consumers who bought the product up to period t − 1 and N denoting the total number of consumers. The function f should satisfy f (x) > 0, f (x) < 0 and f (x) > 0 for the non-negative real numbers to comply with empirical data. Thus, from Eq. 1 follows
We specify feedback affecting the demand side by assuming that for each consumer a the initial valuation θ a is increased by an amount proportional to N t−1 . This effect reflects the notion of "network externalities" increasing the utility of a product with the number of other adopters (David (1985) , Katz and Shapiro (1992) ). Taking this effect into account,
we have a time-dependent individual valuation
with some constant µ which we assume to be independent of a. Note that it is not required that θ a,t ∈ [0, 1], see Eq. 4.
Depending on the nature of the product considered, either one of the feedback effects might vanish. For instance, computer software presumably exhibits only the second kind of feedback effect, while household electronics exhibit only the first.
Note that the two types of macroscopic feedback effects are mathematically equivalent in the sense that with increasing N t−1 the existing gaps between the price of the product and individual valuations of consumers who have not yet bought the product tend to vanish.
For that reason, many qualitative results to not depend upon which type of feedback is considered.
The probability of buying thus increases over time. Indeed, for a consumer who forms her evaluation in period t (condition C), the probability to buy in period t we get
Moreover, in each period the decision of a consumer who formed her evaluation in some earlier period and has not yet bought might be revised. As a result, in our model with feedbacks there exists a range of initial prices (in the parameter setting depicted in Figure   3 (bottom) between approximately 0.41 and 0.53) for which the product "takes off" eventually, despite it would not take-off in the basic model of Section 2. For this range of initial prices, the per-period sales curve exhibits two specific phases. First, a very low sales level persists corresponding to the system being in the non-percolating regime. The dynamics may exhibit a temporary decrease of per-period sales resulting from local diffusion seeds which "die out" before reaching the percolating regime. Second, a "take-off" phase occurring when diffusion seeds which "survived" long enough enter the percolating regime of the dynamics.
The general principle underlying our model is that the diffusion dynamics may "drift" from the non-percolating regime to the percolating regime. This drift occurs because the probability of buying increases over time with the cumulative number of buyers. In the remainder of this section, we present a few instances of such "drift" which were obtained 
with the fraction of buyers n t−1 = Initial price p 0 is set to 0.52.
As Figure 5 demonstrates, the characteristic take-off dynamics displayed by the averaged curves of Figure 4 can be obtained from a single simulation run. This fact is significant, because in the case of macroscopic feedbacks affecting the price, sales numbers averaged over multiple simulation runs are difficult to justify as they would involve different price sequences.
Discussion
We conclude with two comments. First, the paper does not propose that the square lattice is a realistic representation of real-world interaction topologies involved in new-product diffusion. But while the functional form of the time-profile of sales in our model might depend on the particular underlying topology, the effect of delayed "take-off" itself does not: it relies solely on the existence of a percolation threshold p c separating a percolating regime from a non-percolating regime of the dynamics. It is the passage of the dynamics from the former to the latter that facilitates the "take-off" phenomenon.
However, for a certain type of graph structures -called scale-free networks -the percolation threshold tends to zero with a growing number of sites (see Cohen et al. (2000) ).
Thus, delayed "take-off" would not occur in our model with a scale-free network represent- 
